WHY DO PROGRAMS FAIL? AN ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE PROGRAM MANAGER DECISION-MAKING IN COMPLEX AND CHAOTIC PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTS by Neterer, Jonathan M. & Patrone, Michael A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-12
WHY DO PROGRAMS FAIL? AN ANALYSIS OF
DEFENSE PROGRAM MANAGER
DECISION-MAKING IN COMPLEX AND CHAOTIC
PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTS
Neterer, Jonathan M.; Patrone, Michael A.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61231
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.





MBA PROFESSIONAL PROJECT 
WHY DO PROGRAMS FAIL? AN ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE 
PROGRAM MANAGER DECISION-MAKING IN 
COMPLEX AND CHAOTIC PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTS
December 2018 
By: Jonathan M. Neterer 
Michael A. Patrone 
Advisor: Raymond D. Jones 
Co-Advisor: Mitchell S. Friedman 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
MBA Professional Project
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
WHY DO PROGRAMS FAIL? AN ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE PROGRAM 




6. AUTHOR(S) Jonathan M. Neterer and Michael A. Patrone
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 This research attempts to understand potential root causes and underlying factors that influence defense 
acquisition program managers’ decision-making. Using qualitative data gathered through in-person 
interviews and through review of multiple case studies as a research design, this project focuses on how 
program managers gain insight in the decision-making process. Results indicate that program manager 
decision-making is impacted by process, control, relationships, motive, and risk. Analysis of findings 
suggests that defense acquisition oversight and policies create an environment of risk avoidance, causing 
program managers to utilize interpersonal methods of management and decision-making as a method of 
control within their sphere of influence. Additional research into decision-making methodology of program 
managers during critical program milestones is warranted for a more thorough analysis. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
WHY DO PROGRAMS FAIL? AN ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE PROGRAM 
MANAGER DECISION-MAKING IN COMPLEX AND CHAOTIC PROGRAM 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Jonathan M. Neterer, Major, United States Air Force 
Michael A. Patrone, First Lieutenant, United States Air Force 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2018 
Approved by: Raymond D. Jones 
Advisor 
Mitchell S. Friedman 
Co-Advisor 
Raymond D. Jones 
Academic Associate, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
WHY DO PROGRAMS FAIL? AN ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE 
PROGRAM MANAGER DECISION-MAKING IN COMPLEX 
AND CHAOTIC PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTS. 
ABSTRACT 
This research attempts to understand potential root causes and underlying factors 
that influence defense acquisition program managers’ decision-making. Using qualitative 
data gathered through in-person interviews and through review of multiple case studies as 
a research design, this project focuses on how program managers gain insight in the 
decision-making process. Results indicate that program manager decision-making is 
impacted by process, control, relationships, motive, and risk. Analysis of findings 
suggests that defense acquisition oversight and policies create an environment of risk 
avoidance, causing program managers to utilize interpersonal methods of management 
and decision-making as a method of control within their sphere of influence. Additional 
research into decision-making methodology of program managers during critical program 
milestones is warranted for a more thorough analysis. 
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With an annual $100 billion Department of Defense (DoD) procurement budget, 
the stakes are high for program managers (PMs) to adequately navigate the defense 
acquisition process. Defense acquisitions delivers the latest, most technically advanced 
warfighting capability through a complex, multi-layer process that delicately balances 
budget restrictions (cost), product delivery timelines (schedule), and required operational 
capability (performance). Changes to any one of these variables (cost, schedule, or 
performance) affects the others, and it is the responsibility of DoD PMs to orchestrate these 
trade-offs. Add to that balance different external complexities—such as unclear priorities, 
new threats, budget constraints, new or changing technology, regulatory and statutory 
requirements, layers of oversight, federal contracting regulations, changing requirements, 
organizational culture, personal bias, leadership priorities, and federal policy objectives—
and the PM decision-making environment becomes quite complicated.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The DoD has historically struggled to deliver new capabilities, on time and within 
budget. Early on, Congress leveraged little oversight over defense budgets and acquisition 
programs; however, beginning in the late 1960s these struggles gained congressional 
attention. During that time, only 2% of the defense budget required congressional 
authorization (Fox, 2011).  Between 1961 and 1983, congressional budget oversight for 
the DoD increased from 2% to 100% (Fox, 2011). Some might suggest that the change was 
due to distrust in the DoD’s ability to execute major acquisition programs, and that 
congressional members utilized the opportunity to leverage control over projects 
benefitting their constituents (Sorenson, 2009).  
Much of the distrust and policy oversight changes began during the tenure of 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, although acquisition reform has been a focus item 
of every Secretary of Defense since World War II. As a result, Congress instituted over 
nine major acquisition reform initiatives designed to improve processes, reduce risk, and 
reduce program failure rates (Cantwell, Sarkani, & Mazzuchi, 2013). Notable reform 
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efforts include the 1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, the 1994 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act, and the 2009 Weapons 
System Acquisition Reform Act (Congressional Research Service, 2014; Fox, 2011). The 
outcome is a complex defense acquisition process filled with layers of sub-processes for 
budget approvals, design and development, testing, technical readiness, and production, as 
depicted in Figure 1. These reform efforts, while largely beneficial in solidifying process 
control, add additional complexities to an already convoluted process. In review of recent 
DoD programs, data suggests that performance may not be improving.  
 
Figure 1. Process Map of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
Framework. Source: DAU (2018). 
Established by the DoD Authorization Act of 1982, the Nunn-McCurdy legislation 
established reporting thresholds for major acquisition program cost growth. A review of 
21 recent programs that breached those thresholds, as seen in Figure 2, reveals that during 
program execution, poor contractor and/or government PM performance accounted for 
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nearly half of the breaches. Some of these breaches listed include poor performance in 
systems engineering, interface management, limited situational awareness, and inadequate 
contract incentive.  
Figure 2. Root Cause Analysis of Recent Nunn–McCurdy Breaches as 
described by O’Neil (2011). Adapted from OUSD(AT&L)  
(2016). 
Furthermore, between 1998 and 2005, Major Defense Acquisition Program 
(MDAP) per-unit cost estimates grew approximately 250% from baseline to delivery 
(O’Neil, 2011). Between 1997 and 2015, MDAP schedules grew approximately 3% from 
program initiation to Initial Operating Capability (IOC), delivering new capabilities on 
average in about seven years. During that same time, the DoD cancelled approximately 
17% (136) of new MDAPs, resulting in approximately $53.5 billion dollars in sunk costs 
(Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
[OUSD(AT&L)], 2016). 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
As shown, attempted acquisition reform efforts to facilitate program efficiencies, 
reduce risk, and infuse cost savings using best practices in process improvement and 
additional oversight have failed to produce their intended results. This begs the question 
then, if there is an established framework for cost, schedule, and performance for PMs to 
follow, why do programs continue to struggle and fail? A review of published research to 
identify factors that influence the success and failure of DoD programs identified how 
quantitative measures are used to find predictive variables that might influence outcomes. 
A review of previous studies (Clowney, Denver, & Stuban, 2016) identified variables such 
as project efficiencies, leadership, staff experience, policy and strategy, poor planning, and 
risk analysis, among others, as leading drivers. While research highlights lagging indicators 
that resulted in project failure, the problem identified by our team suggests that there is a 
lack of data to supporting potential root causes, through collection of qualitative, cognitive 
data.  
This question is never more important than today. Rapidly evolving space and 
software technology development and implementation by American adversaries threatens 
the nation’s security. As a result, the defense acquisition processes must adapt to deliver 
advanced operational capabilities faster to meet the changing threat environment.  
During his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisitions Dr. William Roper agreed with calls for change. 
He suggested that the DoD must expedite how systems are designed and acquired, 
especially when they support advancing space and software capabilities (HASC, 2018). 
The under secretary of defense for AT&L (USD[AT&L]) also recently stated that we must 
“learn from our experience and work to improve our ability to make sound acquisition 
decisions” (OUSD[AT&L], 2016, p. iii).  
While we acknowledge that process and organizational reform is necessary, we also 
suggest that examining PM decision-making within the DoD acquisition framework is 
necessary to help contribute a three-dimensional understanding of the factors impacting 
DoD acquisition programs, and to influence future acquisition reform changes. 
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C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
A deeper understanding of how PMs make decisions and the mitigating impacts of 
those decisions is necessary to change the acquisition framework in a way that will result 
in an improved return on investment for defense materiel and development programs. The 
purpose of this research is to seek a better understanding of why PMs in high visibility 
programs make decisions and take action during critical program milestones. Therefore, 
this research attempts to identify root causes and underlying factors that influence PM 
decision-making in pursuit of their specific course of action. 
D. SCOPE  
For this study, we gathered qualitative data through multiple, semi-structured 
interviews. The team interviewed two subjects. The interviewees were both Air Force, 
civilian PMs experienced in managing Acquisition Category (ACAT) Level I programs. 
As such, each are current and qualified to Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement 
Act (DAWIA) PM Level III training certification standards. The interviews attempted to 
glean an understanding of the environment in which the PMs operate and some of the 
complexities influencing their decision-making. We acknowledge that the data collected is 
not statistically significant as time and other restrictions limited the effort. The scope of 
our research is intended to be compiled into a larger set of research on the same topic.  
E. METHOD 
In an effort to find explanations of root causes, the team based our data collection 
methods on the grounded theory framework of preparation, data collection, analysis, and 
theory establishment. Our team gathered qualitative data through in-person interviews 
consisting of nine unrestricted questions to allow the subjects’ flexibility in responding to 
the problem statement, as they deemed appropriate. The interviews were conducted in a 
secured facility, limiting data collection to detailed note taking by the team members. 
Follow up interviews were conducted over the phone to clarify any assumptions or miss 
interpretations collected by the team. The team conducted post interview collaboration of 
data to refine the entirety of data collected.  
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The team then utilized a simple coding method to analyze and interpret the data 
collected during interviews. Key objectives, points and patterns expressed in the interviews 
were recorded and analyzed against themes identified during the team’s literature reviews 
of different decision-making methods and processes. The team established five main 
categories to encompass aspects of the decision-making process. These five categories 
included motive, culture, process, relationship, and risk. These categories encompassed 
potential influencers and decision-making styles the subjects used in their programs based 
on specific words or phrases (sub-categories) that relate to a style of decision-making. The 
frequency of the categories used in the interview helped to determine the primary type or 
style the subjects use to make their decisions. We then used the framework to conduct a 
comparison against theoretical models identified in literature in an effort to draw 
conclusions related to the problem statement and potential hypotheses and theory.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Data analytics, process reviews, and course of action (COA) selection, among other 
decision-making efforts, consume a significant amount of a PM’s time. The framework 
and influences used to analyze, select, and implement a decision may be based on several 
factors; therefore, a review of research into decision-making theories is necessary to 
understand these potential influences. Decision-making research is not new. Philosophers 
studying choice, thoughts, and processes extends back hundreds and perhaps thousands of 
years. While outside the scope of this research, the study of the decision-making process 
is more recent. More recent still is the study of decision-making and its impact on various 
intellectual disciplines such as mathematics, sociology, psychology, economics, and 
program management (Buchanan & O’Connell, 2006). For this application, a review of 
four key areas of study was conducted through the lens of decision-making, sensemaking, 
naturalistic decision-making (NDM), and finally through the concept of trust is explored, 
followed by decision-making within organizations. These four areas were selected due to 
the anticipated application to decision-making in an ambiguous and complex environment.  
A. DECISION-MAKING 
The act of decision-making describes a process one takes to establish a position, as 
is the case in the DoD acquisition environment. Decision-making is undertaken utilizing 
three different types of processes, including logic, probability, and heuristics (Gigerenzer, 
2018). Logic theory argues that the answer to any decision-making is based solely on logic. 
Computers and artificial intelligence are examples in that decisions are made objectively, 
without the input of emotion. Probability theory, also known as expected value theory, uses 
mathematics and the probability of potential outcomes to make the decisions based on the 
ones with the highest probability of occurrence. In his interview, Gigerenzer does not prefer 
this method: “Probability theory is useful when there are large amounts of data or simple 
problems. In an uncertain world it has its limits.” Last is heuristics, or tools utilized to make 
efficient decisions. Gigerenzer defines heuristics as a particular stimulus individuals feel 
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that influences the decisions they make. These emotional stimuli create a shortcut for 
individuals to make quick and possibly accurate decisions.  
B. SENSEMAKING 
Decision-making is more than the act of making the decision. Decisions in a 
chaotic, high payoff environment such as DoD acquisitions are made based on several 
internal, external, known, unknown, and personal factors that are often not easily 
quantified. Some decisions are made based on tacit knowledge, while others are made 
based on similar experiences or even perhaps gut feelings. Sensemaking in decision-
making could be considered an application of those factors, knowledge, and experiences 
to a given scenario, for a given outcome. Although conceptualized in the 1970s, its 
applicability to computer interaction, information science, and organizational behavior is 
more recent. Simply put, sensemaking is making sense of a situation or giving meaning to 
an experience. 
1. Klein, Moon, and Hoffman 
Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006a, 2006b) published two articles on the 
applicability of sensemaking to artificial intelligence and computing. While computing was 
not a focus of this research, their use of NDM and cognitive modeling aid in understanding.  
a. Psychology Perspective 
In their article Making Sense of Sensemaking 1, Klein, Moon, & Hoffman (2006a) 
caution the broad-brush use and applicability of sensemaking in data analytics. In doing 
so, they challenge assertions that sensemaking is a reinvention or merger of previous 
research into decision-making processes. The authors use five examples of decision-
making from psychology to highlight differences: situational awareness, curiosity, 
comprehension, creativity, and mental modeling (Klein et al., 2006a). Specifically, while 
each example can be included across the seven principles of sensemaking, neither stands 
alone as they can in decision-making. Klein et al. (2006a) acknowledge that sensemaking 
can be a linking function to help understanding; however, they argue that when viewed 
through those five lenses (p. 71), the fusion of ideas might lead to diluted understanding. 
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To further make their argument, they used empirical examples rooted in NDM to 
challenge those assumptions. Specifically, they use observations and cases grounded in 
NDM that are attributable to sensemaking. Of the six examples provided, three are applicable 
to this research. The first observation refutes that data fusion aids sensemaking. Klein et al. 
suggested that while data fusion can reduce information overload, not having the mental 
model of the data could actually add confusion in understanding the outputs. The second 
observation goes further and refutes the assertion that sensemaking enables connecting the 
dots. For this, they argued that the notion downplays the importance of sensemaking by 
suggesting: “It misses the skill needed to identify what counts as a dot in the first place” 
(Klein et al., 2006a, p. 72). The last observation suggests that more information enhances 
sensemaking. They point to research by Oskamp (1965) and Omodei, M. McLennan, J., 
Elliott, G., Wearing, A., & Clancy, J.. (2005) highlighting the diminishing return on 
performance through information saturation. Klein et al. (2006a) suggested that information 
results in increased confidence. As the amount of information increases “people become 
increasingly overconfident rather than increasingly correct” (p. 73).  
b. Cognitive Model 
In their second article, Making Sense of Sensemaking 2, Klein, Moon, & Hoffman 
(2006b) introduced data/frame theory as an application of technology to sensemaking. 
Their theory utilizes framing during decision-making, suggesting individuals utilize 
several frames in a looping process, as a grounding mechanism to hypothesize information. 
The act of framing occurs during the sensemaking cycle as ideas are accepted or rejected 
(reframed), as seen in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Sensemaking Model Depicting Framing. Source: Klein et al. 
(2006b).  
Their research offered four observations applicable to this thesis. The first they call 
“causal reasoning,” suggested that multiple causal factors are necessary to affect change in 
decision-making. The second observation counters beliefs that establishing early 
hypotheses is detrimental. Klein et al. (2006b) asserted that early understanding and 
framing allows decision-makers to gather and process data necessary for acceptance or 
reframing. Some might argue that early hypotheses setting might lead to confirmation bias; 
however, Klein et al. found that decision-makers often search for clues to counter their 
framing assumptions. Last, they addressed a decision-maker’s ability to adapt sensemaking 
as a skill. While their research did not reveal one’s ability to learn sensemaking, they found 
decision-makers with an “adaptive mind-set” were more likely to utilize sensemaking 
(Klein et al., 2006, pp. 88–89).  
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2. Weick: Organizational Approach 
Karl Weick, considered to be one of the founders of sensemaking, utilized the 
concept in his research to better understand traditional organizational decision-making 
theories. His work described sensemaking as an “interplay of action and interpretation 
rather than the influence of evaluation on choice” (Weick et al., 2005, p. 409). This is an 
important distinction as he cautioned not to equate sensemaking as simply a method of 
understanding through translation; doing so would be an oversimplification of its use 
(Weick, 1995). Weick acknowledged that sensemaking is broadly applicable; however, he 
focused largely on its application through an individual and social framework (Weick, 
1995).  
In Sensemaking in Organizations, Weick (1995) explained his use of “action and 
interpretation” as an active, exploratory engagement of understanding through seven 
properties. The process is not intended to be linear in nature, rather more a guide or manual. 
The first is identity, or the recognition that understanding one’s self and one’s organization 
determines the view. In this context, Weick (1995) was careful to note that identity is often 
both individual and organizationally aligned. Sometimes the identity of the individual is 
similar to the organization, but not always. The second is retrospection. Weick offered both 
caution and optimism, suggesting that reflection of the past to make sense of the current 
situation may be distracting if ones’ values are not grounded over the elapsed experience. 
The first two properties differ from the others as they are more closely aligned with the 
“sense” or understanding.  
The final five properties are more action oriented, or as Weick (1995) suggested, 
they are the “making” portion of sensemaking. The third property is the enactment of 
experiences to help understand and reduce complexity. Enactment is the first step in 
comparing experiences and understanding to current environments. The fourth property 
suggests that sensemaking is social. Weick (1995) recognized influences from 
organizational habits, stereotypes, roles, and responsibilities, among others, as having 
inputs to enactment. The fifth property suggests that sensemaking is always ongoing, with 
no start or stop. The sixth property is the recognition that cues extracted during the process 
help with understanding and serve as a linking function to the larger network of meaning 
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and understanding. The last property is the notion that sensemaking is more about 
plausibility than accuracy. Weick described what he means by saying, “A good story holds 
disparate elements together long enough to energize a guide action, plausibly enough to 
allow people to make retrospective sense of whatever happens” (p. 61).  
3. Thiel, Bagdasarov, Harkrider, Johnson, and Mumford: Ethical 
Decision-Making 
Thiel, Bagdasarov, Harkrider, Johnson, and Mumford (2012) model ethical 
decision-making (EDM) through the lens of sensemaking to expand on questions raised by 
others looking to answer fundamental organizational theory questions about processes and 
misconduct. Specifically, following the 2007–2008 subprime mortgage collapse, the 
natural question was, how was such gross misconduct allowed to infiltrate a system where 
standards, laws, and process oversight ensure rule following. These researchers suggested 
that when complex forces and high-risk situations affect the environment, 
leaders/managers use sensemaking to counter the ambiguity of the situation (Thiel et al., 
2012). Therefore, they argued that to better understand the actors’ decisions, traditional 
decision-making models (EDM specifically) should include attributable factors grounded 
in sensemaking, as seen in Figure 4, to capture complexities and constraints often ignored 
in other models.  
13 
 
Figure 4. Leader Sensemaking Model with EDM. Source: Thiel et al. (2012). 
Similar to DoD acquisitions, ethical dilemmas offer “ill-defined problems that have 
high-stakes consequences” (Thiel et al., 2012, p. 50). Navigating the decision space during 
such dilemmas requires multiple, decision-making inputs such as, recognition of the 
problem, intuitive judgement, the environment, and experiences, among the many. 
Therefore, Thiel et al. (2012) recommend that leaders understand the tenants of 
sensemaking in an effort to better interpret situations and potential constraints found during 
complex decision-making.  
C. NATURALISTIC DECISION-MAKING 
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) is a type of intuitive strategy versus an 
analytical strategy that focuses on experienced personnel making decisions based on the 
recognition of critical information and prior knowledge. Within defense acquisitions, PMs 
performing at an ACAT Level I program have risen through the ranks, earning knowledge 
and experience to potentially lead large programs. Analytical decision-making is a useful 
tool when there are specific goals, complete information, and less pressures such as time 
that allow individuals make the optimal solution. NDM and other versions of intuitive 
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decision-making focus on situations where time pressures and high risks push individuals 
to make rapid and non-perfect solutions instead of spending valuable time and resources 
into looking for the “optimal” solution. 
In the article “Naturalistic Decision-Making in Aviation Environment,” Simpson 
(2001) divulges how NDM is the most effective type of decision-making to use for pilots 
and aircrew inside an aircraft. He states, “It has been discovered through several studies 
that experienced operators in their operational settings (including pilots) make many 
decisions using intuitive rather than analytical strategies.” (p. 20). Simpson also expands 
upon the environment many pilots face: “The cockpit is considered a naturalistic 
environment due to characteristics such as experienced operators, multiple players and 
teams, dynamic conditions, shifting and competing goals, high risks, time pressure, and 
ambiguous or missing data” (p. 1). Due to the dynamic environment and the ever-changing 
information and conditions, NDM cannot provide an optimal solution; rather, it provides a 
solution that satisfies the current need until new conditions, pressures, and restrictions 
reveal a possible new solution.  
Figure 5 shows how the perceived NDM method goes through the phases of 
perceiving the information at hand, analysis, assessment, a nd action. Depending on the 
severity and the pressures of the situation, some routes in the model are pursued while 
others are not. The first phase, perceiving the situation, is taking all of the information 
presented, complete or incomplete, and evaluating all aspects of the situation. The second 
phase is the knowledge-based analysis and pattern match. This stems from past experience 
of the individual or from the team and noting the similarities to the current situation. 
Knowledge of the situation at hand, past experiences, and connections between the two are 
drawn together during this phase to help establish the courses of actions for the next phase. 
15 
 
Figure 5. Synthesized Process Model of NDM. Source: Klein (1993). 
Courses of action is the assessment phase of the model. This takes the four 
parts of the middle figure—goals, cues, expectations, and courses of action—while 
laying out which is the best fit for the current situation, including the high or low 
pressures that will be affecting the decision. Low pressures will shift to an analytical 
method in the courses of action, as show on the left side of the figure, where higher 
pressures play more to the mental simulation and NDM method. After the preferred 
method is conducted, action plays into the implementation of the chosen course. With 
some environments being very static and refined, once implementation of the action 
is taken and completed, work does not have to be further evaluated and improved 
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upon. However, in high pressure, ever-changing dynamic situations where NDM is 
used, the loop is continued and starts back at perceiving the situation.  
1. Militello: Naturalistic Decision-Making and Macro Cognition 
Militello (2008) uses an example of firefighters in a burning house to illustrate how 
NDM is used to make challenging and high-risk situations. She explains, “Under time 
pressure where more than one plausible option does exist, but the decision makers use their 
experience to immediately identify the typical reaction. If they cannot see any negative 
consequence to adopting that action, they proceed with it, not bothering to generate 
additional options or to systematically compare alternatives” (p. 4). In high-pressured 
situations, options cannot typically be deeply weighted against one another and evaluated 
in which is the most optimal solution. Experience and similarities to past events help 
individuals make quick decisions with an acceptable level of confidence on the possible 
anticipated outcome. Militello (2008) stresses that the challenging conditions that are 
presented in each situation make the weighted analysis unachievable, and the most 
effective decision-making process is NDM, using past experiences and past outcomes to 
make a quick, semi-suitable decision.  
2. Klein: A Naturalistic Decision-Making Perspective on Studying 
Intuitive Decision-Making 
Intuition as defined through NDM is the “expression of experience as people build 
up patterns that enable them to rapidly size up situations and make rapid decisions without 
having to compare options” (Klein, 2013, p. 164). Much like previously stated, it is the 
patterns and outcomes of the past experiences which propel individuals to make current 
decisions under high pressures. Individuals do not make a majority of their decisions based 
on optimal performances, but by their past situations and emotional outcomes. Klein (2008) 
expands on this idea, stating that, “Conditions such as amount of information and time 
available determine where decisions fall … whether people rely more on patterns or on 
functional relationships” (p. 457). This expands upon the idea that the pressures faced in 
decision-making affect whether an NDM method or a more analytical method is performed. 
Higher pressures result in the NDM method along with patterns of past relationships where 
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fewer pressures result in the analytical methods and relationships between the multiple 
decision options. 
D. TRUST 
Many aspects of defense acquisitions include ambiguous and undefined elements 
where collaborative teaming is necessary. As such, understanding confidence in 
relationships is necessary for this thesis. “Trust,” when used to describe an act or action, is 
defined as placing confidence or reliance on someone or something without fear or 
misgiving (“Trust,” 2011). Trust in organizations may manifest itself through variables 
such as empowerment, resistance to change, conflict, and innovation, among others 
(Vinebuger, 2010).  
1. Sun: The Decision-Making Dilemma 
Sun offers practical suggestions for building trust in an organization based on 
personal knowledge and experiences. His insights provide wisdom for PM decision-
making. In his article, he asserts that decision-making must not always be based on pure 
data and offers that doing so could result in overlooked intuition. Sun recounts a time where 
his data-driven business model suggested taking the company in a certain direction. Around 
the same time, his engineering and marketing team asked for funding to experiment on 
ideas that were not in line with the model. He reluctantly approved, and the resulting idea 
proved wildly successful. From his experiences, he offers the following advice: 
1. Data is good for analysis, but it cannot be blindly trusted. Likewise, blind 
experienced-based decision-making could also be detrimental. 
2. Do not discount the human factor. While automated intelligence and data 
analytics capabilities increase, the skills and abilities of the human brain are 
far superior.  
3. Cultivate a culture of experimentation. Despite his initial skepticism, his 
team proved the data wrong, and in doing so, instilled a sense of pride and 
buy-in from the team. 
4. Trusting one’s gut (instinct) gets better and easier with experience, as 
tacit knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge. (Sun, 2018)  
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2. Stamp: Trust and Judgment in Decision-Making 
Gillian Stamp is a member of Bioss, a consulting firm focused on people and 
organizational development. The firm claims,  
Organizations that induce anxiety, confusion, mistrust and incompetence 
are costly and less likely to achieve their purposes in the long term. They 
may be effective for some years but they eventually fail their initiators (by 
for instance destroying shareholder value or failing to provide essential 
services to citizens), and thus the confidence the wider society has placed 
in them. (Bioss, 2018, About us) 
During complex, high-stress, or chaotic times, however, PMs might depend on gut instinct 
or best judgement decision-making when data analysis and experience is absent. Stamp 
suggests that when organizations build a framework to cultivate and promote confidence 
in judgement making, it creates buy-in and incentivizes individual performance toward the 
larger goal. Organizations build “confidence and respect, people work together in ways 
that strengthen bonds of mutual trust and fairness, enhance imagination and innovation, 
and ensure competence; thus the organization achieves its purposes and contributes to the 
wider society” (Bioss, 2018, About us). 
Stamp calls organizations who adopt trust in judgement making being “in flow,” 
based on an adapted model from Csikszentmihalyi (1990), as seen in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Depiction of Being in the Flow. Source: Stamp (2007). 
Organizations seeking to achieve stability (in flow) must balance what Stamp 
(2007) calls the trellis or framework of tasking, trusting, and tending, as seen in Figure 7. 
Tasking or delegating provides prescriptive trust by establishing trade space for others to 
explore. “Trust” or “discretionary trust” refers to the amount of latitude given within the 
trade space. Through prescriptive and discretionary trust, organizational leaders signal their 
faith in one’s ability to deliver. As Stamp (2007) highlights, “Prescriptive trust is trust 
without space, and discretionary trust is trust with space.” (para. 16). The last leg of the 
trellis is tending. Just like a farmer in their field, organizational leaders can reap a harvest 
through diligent communication, guidance, and “nudging.” PMs who reinforce purpose, 
shared goals and outcomes, and relevance are better able to lead, and they also create 
incentives for others to explore. Then, when necessary, PMs can nudge or guide progress 
rather than micromanage.  
20 
 
Figure 7. Task, Trust, and Tending Balance. Source: Stamp (2007). 
3. Hurley: Culture Setting 
Robert Hurley studied executives from 30 different companies to determine 
outcomes of trust in organizations. Hurley’s (2006) definition of trust mirrors that found in 
dictionaries, as “confident reliance on someone when you are in a position of vulnerability” 
(p. 2). Additionally, he asserts that when individuals or organizations chose to trust, it is an 
indicator that they have gone through a deliberate, decision-making process where the 
analysis of alternatives are identified, analyzed, and influenced. Hurley’s decision-making 
model attempts to serve as a predictor for trust, based on 10 factors including risk tolerance, 
level of adjustment, relative power, security, similarities, alignment of interests, benevolent 
concern, capability, predictability/integrity, and communication. He identifies and aligns 
these factors under the trustor (decision-maker factors) and trustee (situational factors) seen 
in Figure 8. Hurley defines the trustor as the decision-maker, suggesting that one’s risk 
tolerance, ability to adjust, and level of authority or power dictates the environment for the 
trustee. Depending on the other situational factors, then, will allow the trustee to choose 
between trust and distrust.  
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Figure 8. Predictive Model of Organizational Trust. Source: Hurley (2006).  
Hurley’s (2006) research concludes that organizations with a “strong unifying culture 
enjoy higher levels of trust particularly if their culture values include candor, integrity, and fair 
process than companies without one” (p. 2). Additionally, he concludes that when 
organizations fail to establish a culture of trust, “expensive and sometimes terminal problems” 
emerge through stress, divisiveness, unproductiveness, and threats (p. 1).  
E. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
Understanding how decision-making is conducted in organizations is an important 
variable in this research, as organizational processes, norms, and culture may drive PM 
behavior.  
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1. Proveda-Bautista et al.: Analysis of Decision-Making Models for 
Project Management 
Proveda-Bautista, Garcia-Melon, and Gonzalez-Cruz (2018) conducted a 
quantitative analysis study of PM decision-making maturity of various organizations. To 
do that, the team compared and contrasted the level of maturity (experience) of the PM 
decision-makers to the cultures of their organizations. Their goal was to assess if research 
existed suggesting that advantages of applying a defined process approach was applicable 
across different business types. The team assessed PMs and their organizations using 
interviews and surveys and then classified them according to size and decision-making 
structure. Their data suggested that there is a positive relationship between a company’s 
PM’s level of maturity and their decision process, such that companies tend to use a more 
structured approach to decision-making at higher levels of maturity.  
Though not well refined in the text, the team concluded that well-defined decision-
making models benefit companies, especially as they mature. To draw such a conclusion, 
the team highlighted several probable outcomes: 
• Defined processes aid in building and enforcing process structure 
• Defined processes aid communication from common language setting 
• Defined processes help align and coordinate goals 
• Increased use of databases help project planning (Proveda-Bautista et al., 
2018)  
2. Kim and Mauborgne: Fair Process: Managing in the Knowledge 
Economy 
While not directly applicable in the context of PM decision-making, the findings 
by Kim & Mauborgne (2003) also provide tangible benefit to our thesis. Their work 
centered on outcomes of fair processes within organizational decisions. They espoused that 
employee motivation suffers when workers do not trust management decision-making 
processes. Conversely, worker buy-in increases, even when workers disagree with the 
outcome, when they perceive the decision-making process to be fair. 
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Kim and Mauborgne’s research across 19 organizations identified three guiding 
organizational decision-making principles that are applicable in today’s DoD acquisition 
environment: engagement, explanation, and expectation clarity. They defined 
“engagement” as “involving individuals in the decisions that affect them by asking for their 
input and allowing them to refute the merits of one another’s ideas and assumptions.” (p. 
9). They define “explanation” as “everyone involved and affected should understand why 
final decisions are made as they are.” Finally, they define “expectation clarity” as “once a 
decision is made, managers state clearly the new rules of the game” so that employees 
“know up front by what standards they will be judged and the penalties for failure” (Kim 
& Mauborgne, 2003, p. 10). In the end, they concluded that processes, attitudes, and 
behaviors are linked with communication and trust, and in their absence, personnel and 
project performance is likely to suffer.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the different versions of decision-making methods that our 
team looked into in order to help explain the decision-making process that PMs go through. 
The various methods our team looked into and expanded upon include sensemaking, 
naturalistic decision-making, trust, and organizational decision-making, to name a few. 
Reviewing the different forms of decision-making in this section helps cover the spectrum 
of decision-making, from an analytical style decision-making method to an intuitive style 
decision-making method. Describing all versions of decision-making here ensures that the 
method presented by the interviewees is captured in one or possibly more types of decision-
making, while also helping to explain the thought and calculation process that PMs conduct 
for their unique style of decision-making.  
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A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to disclose the data collected during the research. 
Qualitative data collection consisted of conducting four interviews of two subjects. The 
two subjects were chosen based on acquisition experience, position, and rank/grade within 
the DoD acquisition system. Both subjects were DoD civilians in the grade of NH-4/GS-
14 or above and assigned as Air Force PMs in software intensive programs. Both have 
experience working ACAT I Level programs and are still working high-level programs 
within the DoD. Confidentiality of both subjects limits the amount of identifying 
information used; therefore, the first subject is identified as Subject A, while the second is 
identified as Subject B.  
In preparation for the interviews, the team generated a set of nine broad questions 
to elicit conversational responses from both subjects. The questions mostly prompted the 
subjects to describe scenarios when they faced complex or challenging problems in their 
programs. Follow-up questions were asked to expand on the subjects’ decision-making 
process to overcome those challenging situations. Other questions asked the subjects to 
offer their opinions on how to improve DoD acquisition challenges.  
The responses provided for data collection through identification of potential causal 
factors encountered by both subjects during their time as ACAT I PMs. It also enabled 
comparative analysis of the data identified in the research from literature. The interviews 
were conducted in a secure facility, so recording and transcription of the interviews is 
limited. Therefore, key discussion points were noted and detailed notes taken to collect 
data subsequent analysis. Follow up interviews were conducted by telephone to expand on 
information and clarify assumptions of key points identified during the first interviews. 
This chapter presents and interprets the collected data. 
B. CODE METHOD 
Data collection and codifying took place both during and after the interviews to 
arrange, categorize, and subcategorize the information. Answers were carefully dictated to 
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capture phrases, key words, themes, subject ideas, and other responses to the interview 
questions. Utilizing a qualitative coding structure method identified by Saldana (2009), the 
team identified and coded 27 subcategories within the combined responses to sort the data 
seen in Table 1. Several coded subcategories are applicable across different categories, 
depending on the theme used by the subject.  
Table 1. Coding Summary of Collected Interview Data 
Category Code Code Count Category 
Count 


















Lack of buy-in 1 
Policy 0 







Risk Fear 5 17 
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From the 27 codes, the team then consolidated the data under five major categories 
of motive, culture, process, relationship, and risk. The data was populated into Excel, and 
utilizing structuring techniques identified by Ose (2016), the codes were then quantified 
for analysis. 
C.  CATEGORIES 
The categories selected offer a broad range to encapsulate the topics discussed 
during the interviews and those identified in literature. The categories selected were based 
both on findings from literature and on the anticipated major themes identified during the 
interviews. The categories ultimately serve as the foundational basis for the theories 
identified in the next chapter.  
1. Motive  
When considering possible motives in decision-making, the team established the 
possible external influences that might affect one’s motives in weighing decision options. 
Research by Thiel et al. (2012), Sun (2018), and Kim & Mauborgne (2003) highlight how 
empowering and rewarding positive behaviors may be positive motivators within 
organizations. Likewise, fear may encourage negative behaviors, resulting in self-serving 
motives. Therefore, themes related to buy-in, empowerment, reward, fear, and incentive 
were categorized under motive.  
2. Culture 
Similar to motive, the organizational culture may have an impact on decision-
making. Research by Proveda-Bautista et al. (2018), Stamp (2007), and Sun (2018) touch 
on culture and culture setting as having both a positive and negative influence. Likely 
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themes discussed under this category include the impacts of bureaucracy, management 
oversight, and values of or perceived values of the organization. Other themes might 
include individual expectations, or the perceived value and trust offered to the decision-
makers.  
3. Process 
Process control as highlighted by Proveda-Bautista et al. (2018) increases as 
organizations grow and mature. As noted, the DoD acquisition process is highly regulated 
and controlled, especially as applicable to ACAT I programs. Therefore, the team 
anticipated much discussion around effects of decision-making freedoms within the 
acquisition system. Other related themes may include process design and control, or 
process design and structure. Additional discussions about rules and compliance in relation 
to organizational culture and buy-in could also be applicable.  
4. Relationships 
In any program office, relationships play a key role in both understanding the 
problems or task and managing them from different levels. The fourth major category 
focuses on relationships due to the interpersonal connections that PMs and their teams often 
make with each other, their customer, and the contractor. The team anticipated having 
discussions on relationship disconnects and breakdowns in communication, and what the 
potential effects on program performance during design, development, and production of 
an end item would be. Proveda-Bautista et al. (2018) and Klein (2013) highlight the 
importance of relationships in helping to create an understanding through expectation 
setting between what is being requested from the user and what will eventually be 
produced. Coded phrases or words used under relationship included trust, respect, 
communication, experience, oversight, strengths, and development. These words relate 
back to the main concept of relationship, and when the interviews are conducted, these 
words in context are recorded and tallied to reflect the importance relationships in the 
program office. 
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5. Risk  
The last major category is critical to understanding the impacts of risk on PMs’ 
decision-making. The basic understanding of risk for a program office is the uncertainty of 
an event or condition that, when realized, has a negative effect on a least one of the project’s 
crucial objectives. For any program, PMs must identify and assess the risks to their 
programs and work toward minimizing the impact on the project. For this category, the 
team selected key words and phrases that include fear, control, compliant, oversight, and 
test. These indicators might suggest the span of how PMs view risk and manage the risk 
when realized. Some PM teams fear the possible uncertainties that risks pose to programs 
and employ risk avoidance instead of other risk management methods. Others may try to 
control the risk through additional tests and evaluation methods.  
D. FINDINGS 
As discussed previously, the team interviewed two Department of the Air Force 
civilian PMs with over 70 years of combined experience. Questions used to elicit dialogue 
about their experiences with program difficulties, overcoming challenges, the acquisition 
process, best practices, and process improvement yielded useful data. The data provided in 
Figure 9 shows the PMs are most impacted by processes, followed by culture, then 
relationships, risks, and motives. The following text highlights, by category, the PMs most 
impacting aspects of decision-making within defense acquisitions.  
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Figure 9. Summary of Categorical Data 
1. Interview Summary—Subject A 
Subject A is an ACAT Level I PM with over 40 years of acquisition experience 
across the military, industry, and civil service spectrum. Subject A was interviewed twice, 
both face-to-face and over the telephone. The second interview was conducted to clarify 
and amplify information collected during the first. Data analysis reveals that most of 
Subject A’s responses focused on the three major categories of process, culture, and 
relationships. 
a. Process and Culture 
During the first interview, Subject A was asked for their opinion on ACAT 1 level 
programs and their experience during successes and difficulties. The subject focused much 
of their responses on bureaucracy and oversight, describing the regulatory steps that DoD 
programs must navigate during the project life cycle. The opinion expressed suggested that 
they believe oversight is a large problem, as it adds little value while causing significant 
time and effort to program personnel. The responses contrast Proveda-Bautista et al.’s 
(2018) research on process maturity within organizational decision-making, by describing 
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how process control and cultural norms add complexity and disruption in the PM decision-
making processes. Subject A offered a recent example about staffing a document for 
approval. The document was signed and approved after approximately 60 days in staffing, 
with nearly 30 comments for recommended action. After conferring with the Integrated 
Product Team (IPT), they implemented very few recommendations. When asked why, 
Subject A said that many of the comments were either already implemented as part of the 
program maturity, or not viable due to the individual’s unfamiliarity with the program 
specifics. Despite the frustration of the process, the demonstration of compliance (by 
evaluating the recommendations) with rules and norms suggests that the PM utilized trust 
and perception during the process of determining the implementation of the changes. 
When asked to clarify how decision-making influenced the process, Subject A 
suggested that their experience played a large part. Experience allows PMs to “separate the 
chaff from the flare” when evaluating change recommendations. Based on the PM’s 
experience, they were able to frame the problem, understand the external perceptions, and 
then implement a decision. The description aligns with the sensemaking framing processes 
defined by Klein et al. (2006b), combined with synthesized process in naturalistic decision-
making by Klein (2008). Subject A said that while bureaucratic processes are established 
with good intentions, too many processes and too many inputs from outside oversight 
organizations slows down the program schedules and leads to unnecessary delays.  
b. Culture and Relationships 
Subject A offered additional details on the possible impacts of oversight to PM 
decision-making. Throughout both interviews, Subject A discussed the necessity to 
communicate program details with both internal and external stakeholders and members of 
oversight staffs. Subject A felt strongly that an open and ever-flowing communication 
between offices and teams is critical to program success and mitigating potential program 
risks. Communication also sets expectation baselines for the program teams. Subject A 
stressed that close communication is necessary between the DoD program (the PM), the 
contractor, and the customer (end user) the program is supporting. The use of 
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communication in this context suggests that communication builds a trusting or positive 
relationship between the members of the project team.  
Not only is communication used to ensure the project team is synchronized, but 
also to ensure “higher likelihood that you will stop things from occurring that would occur 
if you weren’t proactive.” Interpreted another way, Subject A viewed communication as a 
way of regaining program control through message shaping. This process of message 
shaping may be due to a feeling or culture where trust is absent, as described by Hurley 
(2006). Additionally, the PM may feel the need to control those processes within their 
sphere of influence due to the lack of control built into the bureaucracy. Stamp and Hurley 
(2006) addressed lack of trust in their organizational development research, suggesting that 
when a framework of trust is absent, performance and personnel buy-in may suffer. 
Unfortunately, message shaping is an inefficient use of a PM’s time, especially when the 
payoff is to prevent someone in a non-decision-making oversight role from disrupting 
program progress. Subject A described it as “frustrating” to ensure that some players are 
on the team even though “they’re not going to get into the game.”  
When asked for ideas to help reduce oversight, Subject A’s responses reflected 
many of the themes related to relationships. Subject A suggested that for programs to 
succeed, more emphasis on ownership should be placed on the PM position. Doing so 
forces PMs to lead and be held accountable to make critical decisions instead of relying on 
process oversight and direction from their superiors. This echoes the findings described by 
Stamp (2007), Hurley (2006), Kim and Mauborgne (2003) when assessing trust in 
organizations. The concept of ownership and buy-in was a major theme for Subject A and 
Subject B (addressed in the following section), as later in the interview, when discussing 
challenges in the acquisition processes, Subject A suggested that often during new-start 
programs there are “many opportunities to find someone to take ownership.”  
Digging deeper into the concept of ownership, the team pressed Subject A to 
elaborate. Subject A stated that communication, initiative taking, and teaming align to 
create incentives to cultivate PM buy-in, ultimately leading to better decision-making. In 
his research, Stamp calls it being in balance or in flow. Subject A suggests that when trust 
is communicated and demonstrated to PMs, they are more likely to feel empowered to take 
33 
ownership of their program. The empowerment comes from the PM and their team 
members having discretionary trust of the program and the relationship built through 
communication. When asked if they felt empowered in their role, Subject A said that the 
program office leadership believed strongly in holding PMs accountable. The direction at 
the local level is to follow the law, but they are encouraged to push the envelope when 
constrained by rules and regulations, so long as “no one is getting fired, and no one goes 
to jail.”  
2. Interview Summary—Subject B 
Subject B is an ACAT Level I PM with over 30 years of acquisition experience in 
both the military and civil service spectrums. Subject B was interviewed twice, both face-
to-face and over the telephone. The second interview was conducted to clarify and amplify 
information collected during the first. During decision-making, data analysis reveals that 
Subject B focused on three major categories: motive, relationships, and risk. 
a. Motive and Risk 
The prevalent focus for Subject B was incentives and motives. Subject B spent a 
significant portion of the interview discussing incentives and rewards in decision-making. 
Subject B explained that bad performance in program offices starts with bad incentives, 
clarifying that many PMs placed in program offices do not have the motivation to lead 
successful programs due to the rules and policies that are in place. Subject B feels that 
policies and guidelines that program offices must follow constricts the program teams from 
creating and exploring new innovative methods to lead programs. For instance, if a PM 
delivers a marginally effective product on time and on budget, the PM may be rewarded 
for his or her ability to manage schedule and cost. Conversely, another PM may overrun 
cost and schedule to deliver a more capable product and be scrutinized. As Subject B stated,  
There might be a compelling rationale for why someone needs a little more 
time. There might be a good reason why overhead associated with artifacts 
and documents for the staff are essentially meaningless, and we should not 
be engaged in, because it doesn’t add value to the product.  
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Subject B described the second dilemma as a “decision-making box.” Stamp (2007), in his 
research, calls this “prescriptive trust” or a lack of trade-space in decision-making.  
Taken further, Subject B described Stamp’s box in terms of trust or risk, suggesting, 
“These policies and guidelines constrict the program managers and how they perceive 
risk.” Imposing constraints on PMs incentivizes them to remain in a trust safe zone for 
decision-making, where decisions made outside of that safe zone incur risk. Subject B 
explained that when PMs are not incentivized, they become complacent and comfortable 
with the “don’t rock the boat” concept. This suggests that instead of challenging potential 
constraints imposed though rules and guidelines, PMs avoid mistakes and risk-taking by 
relying on safe decisions. Viewed through literature, perhaps this risk avoidance behavior 
is rooted in sensemaking or NDM, as PMs associate risk with failure through learned 
experiences.  
b. Relationships 
Understanding the framework through which Subject B views the acquisition 
environment, the team inquired about potential strategies used to navigate such a chaotic 
environment, or perhaps why some programs are more successful than others given similar 
situations. Their response suggests that Subject B utilizes trust and expectation setting, as 
discussed by Hurley (2006) and Stamp (2007), in relationship-building techniques. Subject 
B suggests, 
Program managers have to take responsibility for their programs and be 
rewarded for improvement not stagnation. These same program managers 
have to also build a culture in these programs through their leadership to 
take an honest approach at their programs they are in.  
Subject B explained that experience has taught them the importance of communication 
between all stakeholders. For their team, Subject B establishes metrics to gauge and track 
the perceptions and satisfaction of the customer and the relationship with suppliers. While 
not qualitatively realistic, Subject B is implementing methods described by Sun (2018) and 
Klein (2013) to intuitively gauge performance through qualitative measures. Additionally, 
through setting and enforcing expectations with the customer, supplier, and project team, 
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Subject B is demonstrating trust and organizational decision-making techniques described 
by Stamp (2007), Hurley (2006), and Kim and Mauborgne (2003). 
When asked to offer an experience with a complex, chaotic program, Subject B 
described an experience where their team was tasked to develop a $1.5 million software 
capability. The project faced several challenges early in the development process, 
ultimately driving the program over budget and over schedule. Prior to project completion, 
the customer abruptly canceled the program and sourced the capability from a commercial 
vendor. While the commercial product did not meet all of the customers’ needs, the basic 
capability was sufficient to justify canceling the program. In reflection, Subject B described 
their failure to recognize the competitor’s technological advances. Rather than criticize the 
team for their failure, Subject B took ownership of the cancelation and then sat with each 
team member to analyze where they could have identified and predicted potential danger. 
Subject B conveyed that in following that process, they communicated trust and respect to 
the team, aided in team development, and, in the end, increased team cohesion.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The two interviews and associated data identified during the coding process support 
findings in literature that sensemaking, NDM, trust, and the organizational environment 
affect PM decision-making. The data revealed interesting results to this research team. The 
team anticipated that the subjects would discuss more about how their experiences and 
training influenced their decision-making; therefore, it was interesting to find out 
otherwise. As expected, both of the subjects discussed bureaucratic processes, policy, 
oversight, and control as elements affecting their decision-making. It was unexpected, 
however, to uncover the level of impact that relationships, trust, and use of incentives were 
used during the management of their programs. The next chapter synthesizes the data to 











A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Utilizing data from the previous chapter, this chapter offers our analysis of the 
various factors affecting a PM’s ability to make decisions. Several conclusions were 
generated based on coded information. As is explained here, the categories most affecting 
the PM decision-making are process, culture, and risk, while relationships and motive were 
revealed as management techniques to navigate the environment. To conclude, this chapter 
also offers two hypotheses and theories concerning the defense acquisition environment.  
B. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Analysis of the data provided good insight into how current PMs view the 
acquisition environment. The data suggests that the leading cause affecting PM decision-
making is the restrictions imposed through processes and oversight within the acquisition 
environment. This is identified in the two leading categories of process and culture, as was 
anticipated from the research from organizational decision-making. Data from 
organizational decision-making shows a positive correlation between organizational 
maturity and process maturity. Years of acquisition reform highlighted in Chapter I have 
aided in process maturity within the DoD. Although well intentioned, however, reform 
efforts to improve oversight, reduce risk, and aid cost control may actually drive negative, 
unintended consequences. During the interviews, both PMs discussed the challenges 
caused by these layers of bureaucracy, describing them as little value added to their 
programs.  
C. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY 
Over time, these restrictions create a culture of risk avoidance, decision safety, 
program inefficiency, and lack of ownership buy-in within the acquisition culture. This is 
identified in the fourth-highest coded category, risk. From the literature, risk may be an 
element that spans across sensemaking, NDM, and trust, depending on how it is 
manifested. Process and oversight as discussed by Hurley (2006), Stamp (2007), and Sun 
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2018 may demonstrate a lack of trust in PM decision-making by imposing trade space 
between acquisition policy and acquisition law.  
  
Figure 10. Depiction of the Acquisition Environment 
PM decision-making is bounded in defense acquisitions by law. Shown in Figure 
10 as the outermost black box. Decisions made within the box, may be done with some 
latitude. As highlighted in Chapter 1, when defense acquisition programs fail, layers of 
implemented defense acquisition reform, policy, and process control are implemented, 
restricting decision-making trade space in an effort to avoid and prevent risk. However, 
these external pressures unintentionally create a decision-making box as described by 
Stamp (2007) and discussed by Subject B. PMs are incentivized to make decisions within 
“safety” of the box, depicted in Figure 10 with the green shaded area. Decisions made 
outside the box incur risk, and therefore PMs are disincentivized from doing so. The 
perpetuation of risk avoidance occurs as PMs develop within defense acquisitions, causing 
many to become reluctant to take risks due to past experiences in similar situations (NDM) 
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or blunt potential framing abilities (sensemaking). One can conclude that this breeds 
inefficiencies, stifles innovation, and promotes lack of trust within the culture.  
The data also suggests that due to process oversight, PMs utilize interpersonal 
methods of management and decision-making as a method of control within their sphere 
of influence. This is most evident in the motive and relationship categories, as both PMs 
described this phenomenon during their interviews. Subject A described a necessity to 
proactively over-communicate in an effort to preempt any unforeseen distraction or 
derailment of their efforts. Some call this expectation management or expectation setting. 
Within NDM, expectations may be external to the organization, while in organizational 
decision-making, expectation setting is conducted in an effort to build internal trust. 
Subject B described utilizing empowerment and incentives in an effort to gain buy-in and 
drive innovation, or as Stamp describes, “in flow.” When asked, both Subject A and 
Subject B suggested that their experiences played a key role in their understanding of the 
environment and approach to managing their programs. Motive and relationships tie back 
to Klein and NDM through trust, respect, and experience, as it is an “expression of 
experience as people build up patterns that enable them to rapidly size up situations and 
make rapid decisions without having to compare options” (Klein, 2013, p. 164). Therefore, 
we offer the following hypotheses and theories. While understandingly simplistic to grasp 
and intuitive in approach, they warrant deeper understanding and further research to better 
understand their impacts.  
• Hypothesis: PM decision-making is heavily dependent on the experience 
and culture of the program office. 
• Theory 
With restrictions in place on program offices by regulations and policies, PMs 
combat the limitations by shifting the culture of their office to better fit their objectives and 
views. As explained by both subjects, the culture in their office is more open and based on 
mutual trust and communication with team members. This contradicts the personal 
experience the subjects have had with other offices stating that the previous offices were 
restrictive, with too much oversight that stifled the program team’s production and 
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ingenuity. As explained by Subject A, there is too much process control and approvals that 
a PM needs to go through for the program to move forward, regardless if the approvals 
affect the program or not:  
I think it’s probably just a process. I think there’s a definite lack of trust, 
you know, from the bureaucracy because, to me, it’s the message of 5000.2 
and everything else is—as I told you all before, to me, you only give 
accountability to the PO and the PM and get out of the way. But they seemed 
to have an overall lack of trust because you gotta come in at various 
milestones. How are you doing? Come back again with, you know, a 
boatload of documents for approval. It doesn’t seem like that was really 
directly affect[ing] your program, but you have to go through the gauntlet 
for approval nonetheless. 
To shape the culture of the office and avoid the type of restrictions placed on the 
office from policies, the PMs have given leniency to the processes conducted by team 
members, as well as asked individuals for their own input and perception of the tasks. As 
quoted by Subject A, a baseline expectation for the program must be met and understood 
by all team members for this type of unrestricted culture to flourish. Both Subject A and B 
come to their team with the expectations that each individual will get their own work done 
with no or as little oversight as possible. Subject A said,  
I’m expecting you (project team) to do it without a lot of management. So, 
there’s a trust there, right, because you could just sit back, but things won’t 
be getting done, and eventually that’ll come to a head. But I’m not gonna 
sit there and necessarily direct every step of the way and write your musical 
notes for you. So, we have an overall type of music that we’re thinking 
about from a higher level, right. 
Of all the elements that make a culture these PMs created, one of the most important 
is the experience of the team members. The experience in programs and tasks similar to 
the ones in their current program face allow the team members to modify or fall back on 
past methods. This experience allows the PMs to have the level of open trust that requires 
less oversight, control, and policy restrictions. Subject A stated, 
I’d say I definitely rely a lot on experience, but I rely on the organization 
because I frequently tell everyone that if I’m in the room and the only one 
talking, that’s a bad thing. I really want others to bring in their views and 
opinions of which way we think this should go because there’s always many 
different ways. So, even though I’m fortunate and I have a lot of experience, 
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sometimes I can—you know, I can see that, well, this probably should go 
this way, but I try to bring in the organization to let them come up and, you 
know, make that recommendation on which way to go. 
The culture created by each team member’s past experiences allows the program 
team to attempt other processes that could be more beneficial to the program as a whole. 
This culture created reflects a hybrid method between sensemaking and NDM method.  
Sensemaking is the application of tacit knowledge, experience, and intuition of a 
given situation, whereas NDM is based on the concept of similar past experiences that the 
individual uses for quick, decisive choices based on the limited knowledge available at the 
time. Both of these methods describe the culture created by the using experience, and other 
personal factors not easily quantified. This fits the new culture and methodology that the 
two subjects use in their offices to create an office that is both effective and productive. 
PMs use a hybrid approach of these two decision-making methods for their program 
offices, because of the bureaucracy that limit them. For PMs in high visibility programs to 
make critical decisions, the hybrid decision method provides the key experience, 
knowledge, and instinct for programs to be successful. 
• Hypothesis: Highly regulated environments restrict decision-making trade 
space, causing PMs to utilize relational and motive-based methods to 
manage programs.  
• Theory 
As discussed in the introduction, defense acquisition reform efforts instituted over 
the last 50 years created a heavily regulated environment. The policy, oversight, and 
bureaucracy growth eroded trust and constricted trade space for PM decision-making. As 
a result, the culture in defense acquisitions program management has transformed into one 
that disincentivizes efficient decision-making, leading to program inefficiencies and cost 
expansion, thereby negating the improvements anticipated by the reform effort. Evidence 
collected through our interviews and literature review supports this theory. 
Subject A and Subject B talked extensively about the acquisition process and its 
inefficiencies. Supported in organizational decision-making and trust literature, this 
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suggests that there is a lack of trust in the external culture between major defense 
acquisition oversight and the PM. Additionally, both PMs highlighted the importance of 
instituting trust and international methods to manage programs within their span of control. 
In the end, the data analysis really reveals two differing cultures within defense 
acquisitions, the first being the external environment, defined by processes, control, policy, 
and oversight. The second is the internal environment, defined by relationships, trust, and 
incentives. It is in the internal environment where PMs have most control. This was most 
evident to the team during the second round of interviews. When asked if the PMs felt 
empowered, both affirmed trust and empowerment at the local levels. The conclusion is 
that these two cultures, as shown in Figure 10, work in opposition to each other. The 
external restricts PM decision-making and the internal—utilizing NDM, sensemaking, and 
organizations of trust—pushes back in an effort to gain back lost trade space. The resulting 
friction between the external and internal environments prevents the defense acquisition 
organization from operating in flow.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided analysis of the data gathered for this limited research project. 
It highlighted how the five categories of processes, culture, relationships, motives, and risk 
affect PMs in the defense acquisition environment. The chapter concluded by introducing 
two hypotheses. The first claims that decision-making is heavily dependent on a PM’s level 
of experience and the culture around them. The second claims that regulated environments 
restrict decision-making, causing PMs to compensate with interrelation management and 
decision-making techniques. The last chapter concludes the research and offers 




A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research was to seek a better understanding of why PMs in high 
visibility programs make decisions and take action during critical program milestones. The 
research also identified root causes and outlying factors that influence PM decision-making 
in pursuit of their specific course of action. From our results and data pulled from both 
interviewees, our team identified five categories that influence PMs’ decision-making: 
motive, culture, process, relationship, and risk. Our hypotheses suggest that a combination 
of both culture and regulated environments shape and greatly influence the critical 
milestone decisions for a PM. Further understanding of the five categories and the outliers 
behind PMs’ decisions can guide future DoD acquisition programs to become more 
successful in the eyes of the customer and the DoD.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 
This project was designed to be limited in scope due to the time allotted for 
completion. Therefore, the first recommendation for continued research into decision-
making methodology of PMs during critical program milestones is warranted in an effort 
to build statically significant data for a more thorough analysis. Additional data will help 
identify these root causes and outlying factors that influence the PM’s decision-making in 
their programs. The information provided by this team’s two interviewees sheds light into 
the methodology of their decision-making process; however, the more interviews and 
individuals participating in the research can provide further data and help expand upon the 
data provided in this thesis and others similar to the purpose. Additional recommendations 
include a comparative analysis of PM decision-making over time to determine how 
decision-making evolves throughout an individual’s growth in DoD acquisition. The 
potential growth and change from one type of decision-making method to another 
throughout PMs’ time in DoD acquisition will help shed insight on how different 
experiences, programs, and other outliers can potentially shape PMs’ decision-making 
before they become leaders of ACAT I level programs.  
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